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THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE:
ISSUES IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS
Lewis M. Alexander
As all of you are probably aware, the
10-week-long Caracas session of the
Third Law of the Sea Conference was
recently concluded. One hundred and
thirty-seven delegations were at the
Conference, representing 90 percent of
the independent states of the world. All
types of countries were in attendancecoastal states, landlocked, shelf-locked,
island states, archipelagos, straits states,
and states through which landlocked
countries must transit to obtain access
to the sea. There was also, of course, the
familiar dichotomy of developed and
developing countries.
No tangible progress was made at
Caracas toward the conclusion of a new
Law of the Sea Convention. No articles
of the new Convention were adopted;
no formal votes were taken on substantive issues; and no declaration of principles emerged from the proceedings.

This is hardly surprising, not only in
view of the number and diversity of
countries attending, but also because of
the complexity of issues involved in the
new Convention. For many delegations
the decision matrix presented to them
was little short of bewildering. In their
opening statements at the early plenary
session, a number of countries pointed
out the need for a "package" arrangement, in which one country or group of
countries would make concessions on
certain issues in order to win support
for other issues. But the conditions
under which such trade-offs might be
made never seemed to coalesce. Moreover, highly complex issues such as
liability provisions for tankers of the
price-setting functions of the proposed
Seabed Authority were sometimes
looked upon as great-power ploys to
divert the attention of the less
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developed countries from their more
immediate objectives. The solidarity of
the so-called "Group of 77" developing
states (which, in reality, now has 103
members) was often strained, and some
less developed countries suspected the
maritime powers of exacerbating these
strains by pointing out to certain of the
less developed countries how much their
real-world ocean interests differed from
those of their neighbors. For example,
many of the developing landlocked
states were insisting on their rights to
benefit from the fisheries resources off
their neighbors' coasts (a right which
had been supported by a recent declaration of the Organization for African
Unity). But adjacent coastal states, as,
for example, Tanzania, while agreeing to
this in principle, were sobered by the
facts; first, that they have only limited
fisheries resources in their coastal
waters; second, that they may be
bordered by two or more landlocked
nations (Tanzania has five such neighbors); and third, that most of the
landlocked countries have a number of
coastal neighbors and thus the potential
for sharing in the resource development
of several offshore zones. How would
the allocation of economic zone resources then be worked out? The
United States and Canada, I might note,
have no landlocked neighbors to worry
about.
I emphasize this problem of access to
the sea and its resources because it
points up so clearly one of the divisive
elements within the Third World blocand within geographic groupings of the
less developed countries, such as the
Latin American, African, and Arab
blocs. The many pressures for and
against bloc solidarity were superimposed on the already complex issues
of the individual states' ocean interests,
leading one to speculate as to just what
the processes will be whereby individual
delegations decide on how to cast their
votes-when the time for vote casting
finally comes.

There was something of a built-in
resistance to decisionmaking at Caracas
in that no deadlines existed for voting.
Everyone knew there would be at least
one follow-up session next summer, and
indeed one has been scheduled for
Geneva next 17 March to run until early
May. Add to this the facts; first, that
the delegates had before them at the
opening of the Conference no single
draft text with which to work; and
second, that the voting procedures
themselves are extremely cumbersome.
The chairman of the Conference must
officially find, for every issue voted on,
that no consensus is possible before a
vote-based on the principle of a twothirds majority of Conference participants-can take place.
So far as the law of the sea issues
themselves are concerned, I have arbitrarily arranged them into 12 items and
combined them under certain headings.
My intent is to consider each of the 12
in terms of the problems involved, the
U.S. position as presented at Caracas,
and of the interests of other countries in
the issue. And before I begin, one caveat
is necessary. Although I attended the
Conference for a time this past summer
as an adviser (or "expert" as we were
termed) with the U.S. delegation, my
remarks today should in no way be
construed as reflecting official U.S.
policy. I speak only as a private citizen.
Now first, a rundown on the 12
issues.
Under the general heading of "Zonal
Arrangements" are three topics: the
territorial sea, the economic zone, and
limits to seabed jurisdiction.
A second general heading is "Traditional High Seas Freedoms" and includes freedom of navigation, freedom
of fishing, and freedom of scientific
research.
Under the third heading, "Environmental Protection" is only one issueestablishing and enforcing pollution
control measures.
Issues eight and nine come under the
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title "Exploiting Seabed Resources."
Number eight is The International Seabed Resources Authority, and nine is
revenue sharing on the outer continental
margin.
Another general heading is "Dispute
Settlement Arrangements" and contains
only the one issue, criteria and machinery for handling international disputes.
The last two issues involve "Regional
Arrangements." First, there are what I
would call mutual benefit systems, such
as regional fisheries or pollution control
agreements. Then there are compensatory arrangements which are designed
to benefit the geographically disadvantaged states.
In establishing my list of 12 issues, I
do not mean to imply that they are all
of equal complexity. And someone else,
in looking over the list of some 100
topics the Conference is supposed to
deal with, inight come up with a different grouping of subjects. But this
listing is intended only to serve as a
means of organizing a lot of complicated material into a manageable form.
One point should be noted early on.
The delegates to the Third Law of the
Sea Conference are not working in a
vacuum. There exists already a body of
rules and regulations on the public order
of the oceans, which was hammered out
at the First Law of the Sea Conference
in 1958 and which has been modified
somewhat by subsequent court decisions and by state practice. Although
some of the more extreme delegates
have declared the 1958 Conventions to
be obsolete and of another era, these
Conventions nevertheless provide the
base upon which the new Law of the
Sea is to be built. Unless and until the
Convention articles are superseded and/
or formally renounced by most of the
world community, they would appear,
according to most authorities of which I
know, to remain in force.
Let us start now with the first issue,
the territorial sea. Two sets of problems

are involved here: the breadth of the
territorial sea and the baselines from
which the breadth is measured. Most
states of the world now favor 12 miles
for the breadth of the territorial sea,
even though by such action most of the
international straits of the world are
closed off by territorial waters. About
half of the coastal countries of the globe
now adhere to 12 miles. The United
States has announced its willingness to
support the 12-mile principle, providing
satisfactory arrangements can be
worked out on the question of transit
(or passage) through international
straits. But some 10 countries, most of
them in Latin America, claim a 200-mile
territorial sea and have indicated no
willingness to reduce this distance to 12
miles, even if a new Convention came
into force. One problem seems to be to
prevent other states from going to a
200-mile limit before a new treaty is
signed and ratified.
The baseline delimitation question
was, to some extent, resolved in the
1958 Convention, but there remain
problems such as historic waters, atolls,
drying rocks and reefs, artificial structures, and other topics not covered
adequately at the First Law of the Sea
Conference. And there is the problem of
archipelagos-a topic now recognized as
a separate and distinct issue which must
be dealt with apart from the question of
islands. One problem here concerns delimitation; in all cases can the archipelagic state connect its outermost
islands and drying rocks with straight
baselines (regardless of the distances and
extent of waters involved) and from
these baselines measure seaward its territorial waters? What of mainland states,
such as Greece and Canada, which have
offshore archipelagos? Can the islands as
a group be closed off here, as in the case
of midocean situations? Should archipelagos still under colonial rule, such as
the Cook Islands and the New Hebrides,
be closed off by straight baselines the
same as for independent states? The
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United States, here as in other cases of
baseline delimitations, has tended to
follow a somewhat cautious and conservative approach.
Perhaps more important than the
delimitation details is the question of
passage by foreign vessels through archipelagic waters. One suggestion is that
the archipelagic state establish sealanes
through its interisland waters. Within
these lanes both commercial and military vessels would have transit rights,
although some states have suggested
that these rights extend only to commercial vessels. The United States would
favor the principle of unimpeded passage through such sealanes, including
overflight and the passage of submarines
submerged.
A related topic is that of the contiguous zone. In the past this zone has
existed between the outer limits of the
territorial sea and 12 miles from shore.
Within it the coastal state has the right
to prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, sanitary, and immigration laws. If
all states go to a 12-mile territorial sea,
is the contiguous zone concept still
necessary? Some states favor applying it
to a zone seaward of the 12-mile limit,
but to this the United States is opposed.
Beyond the territorial sea will be an
economic zone, extending to a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles
from shore. If a 12-mile territorial sea
were adopted by all countries, the maximum breadth of the zone would, of
course, be 188 miles. Most states agree
that within the economic zone there
will be freedom of navigation and overflight (although they do not mention
the passage of submarines submerged)
and freedom to lay underseas cables and
pipelines.
The United States has indicated its
willingness to support the economic
zone concept, providing "correlative
coastal state duties" are accepted. In his
speech of 11 July, Ambassador Stevenson, head of the U.S. delegation, suggested that the coastal state rights

include "full regulatory jurisdiction"
over the exploration and exploitation of
economic zone resources, but 4 weeks
later, the U.S. Draft Articles on the
Economic Zone mentioned the "sovereign and exclusive rights" of the coastal
state to explore and exploit these resources. Among the "correlative coastal
state duties" which the United States
seeks to obtain are the prevention of
unjustifiable interference with navigation, overflight, and other nonresource
uses and compliance with international
environmental obligations. We also seek
full utilization of fisheries resources in
the coastal economic zone, freedom of
scientific research there, and flag-state
enforcement of pollution control
measures. These duties will be considered in more detail later.
If a 200-mile exclusive economic
zone were adopted worldwide, some 37
percent of the world ocean would be
closed off within national limits. Several
countries would acquire large areas (the
United States alone would receive 2.2
million square miles of ocean space),
but many states would get little or no
additional territory. Thus the rationale
for "compensating" the landlocked and
other geographically disadvantaged
states by permitting them to share in
the be1lefits derived from resource
utilization in their neighbors' economic
zones. Some of the disadvantaged at this
time claim rights only to the living
resources of neighboring zones; others
want to share also in the exploitation of
nonliving resources, particularly oil and
natural gas.
A special delimitation problem for
the 200-mile zone relates to islands.
Any naturally formed area of land
above water at high tide is an island
entitled to its own territorial sea. Will it
also be entitled to a 200-mile economic
zone? If so, a single midocean rock
might have surrounding it an economic
zone which closes off 125,000 square
nautical miles of ocean. On this question of economic zones about islands,
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the United States has not declared its
position one way or the other.
Beyond the 200·mile economic zone
of certain countries there may still exist
portions of the continental margin. In
some instances the shelf itself may
extend more than 200 miles from shore.
In other cases only the continental slope
and/or rise may continue so far from
land. The United States and several
other states have suggested that national
control over the resources of the seabed
and subsoil should extend either to 200
miles off shore or to some alternative
limit on the seabed, for example, the
3,000-meter isobath, whichever gives to
the coastal state the greatest amount of
seabed areas. No specific criterion for
fixing this outer limit, beyond the
200-mile boundary, has been specified
by the United States. Probably it would
be based on some depth criterion; the
two depth figures most often cited are
2,500 and 3,000 meters. The isobath
selected might provide a very general
basis for the boundary location, with
straight lines joining fixed geographic
coordinates marking the precise boundary position. Obviously the greater the
area of seabed under national jurisdiction, the less will remain as the "common heritage of mankind." Extending
coastal state jurisdiction over seabed
resources to 200 miles and/or the outer
portion of the continental margin would
mean that the hydrocarbon resources of
the ocean floor would, for all practical
purposes, be lost to any International
Seabed Authority.
According to the U.S. Draft Articles
of this past summer, the coastal state's
sovereign rights over the Continental
Shelf are restricted to the purposes of
exploring and exploiting its natural resources. Other uses of the seabed beyond territorial limits by member states
of the international community presumably are not affected by these
coastal state rights.
One problem common to all three
zonal issues mentioned so far is the

delimitation of boundaries between
opposite and adjacent zones. What
weight shall be given to uninhabited
islands and rocks located close to a
proposed boundary? What of islands in
dispute between countries; how can
they be taken into consideration in
determining limits? Under what conditions can recourse be had to "special
circumstance" situations? Such questions have existed in the past, and in a
few areas, such as the North Sea and the
Persian (or Arabian) Gulf, they have
been resolved. But soon delimitation
problems may be magnified through the
establishment of the extended economic
zone beyond territorial limits.
We come now to the general heading
"Traditional Freedoms of the High
Seas," and the first of these is freedom
of transit. So far as territorial waters are
concerned, the right of innocent passage
is guaranteed in the 1958 Geneva Convention. Passage is innocent so long as it
is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order, or security of the coastal state.
But some people claim that the determination of "innocent" and "noninnocent" passage can become a subjective matter. Take, for example, vesselsource pollution standards. A coastal
state may claim that foreign vessels
which do not observe the coastal state's
pollution control regulations are endangering the state's interests; hence,
passage by such vessels is not innocent.
Or, a coastal state may assert that
transit through-or overflight of-its
territorial waters by the military craft of
certain foreign powers endangers its
security and thus is not innocent. Which
brings up the problem of straits.
The United States favors unimpeded
passage through straits used for international navigation. Passage includes the
movements by surface vessels-both
commercial and military-by aircraft
and by submerged submarines (although
through some straits, such as Malacca,
passage submerged is highly dangerous,
if not impossible). The United States is
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willing to accept obligations so far as
taking reasonable measures to insure
against vessel-source pollution in straits
and to in no way interfere with the
internal security of states bordering the
transited strait.
There are many variations on this
theme. Some countries distinguish between straits connecting two parts of
the high seas with one another and
those connecting the high seas with
territorial waters; only in the former
situation, according to these proponents, would freedom of transit be
guaranteed. There are states which want
prior notification and a constant requirement for the passage of military
vessels through international straits;
there are others which balk at the
submerged submarine concept. Perhaps
only a selected number of straits should
be designated as coming under the
regime of unimpeded passage. Here is an
issue with which only a relatively small
number of states are directly involved
(those bordering on the affected straits
and those seeking passage through
them), but an issue with strong emotional overtones and the potential for
conflict between the developed maritime and many of the developing nonmaritime countries.
Another traditional freedom of the
high seas is fishing. But in the economic
zone the coastal state will have jurisdiction over living resources. The United
States has suggested that within its
economic zone the coastal state has the
duty to conserve these resources. More
important, perhaps, the United States
has joined with several other countries
in supporting the "full utilization" principle; that is, if the coastal state is
unable to harvest the full fisheries potential in its economic zone, it is obligated to permit foreign fishermen to
come in and exploit the unutilized
species. This is a worthy concept; without it the total world catch might
decline as coastal states fail to harvest
the full potential within their economic

zone. It is estimated that over 90
percent of the world fisheries catch is
taken within 200 miles of shore.
But what body is to set the "optimal
yield" for a given economic zone-that
is, the total allowable catch per year
according to biological, economic, and
other considerations? It is the difference
between the coastal state's harvest
potential and this optimal yield figure
which foreign fishermen are to exploit.
And who will set the priorities for
determining which foreign fishermen
will be permitted to harvest the unutilized stocks, and what fees or royalties they will pay to the coastal states
for the privilege of such exploitation?
These seem the type of questions for
in terna tional dispute settlement
machinery to handle.
The United States has suggested that
for highly migratory species such as
tuna an international organization
should control exploitation, even in the
coastal states' economic zones. And in a
move away from high seas freedoms, the
United States has suggested that the
coastal state retain control over anadromous species (particularly salmon)
which in their early life cycle inhabit its
rivers. These fish move down to the
oceans for most of their mature life,
before returning to the rivers to spawn
and die. Coastal state control over the
harvesting of such species would be
retained no matter where in the ocean
such fish move to during the salt water
phase of their cycle. Such an arrangement currently exists in the Northeast
Pacific under a treaty involving the
United States, Canada, and Japan.
Freedom of scientific research is an
issue on which the United States has
few supporters. We are willing to carry
out certain obligations, including prior
notification of the intent to carry out
research in a foreign state's economic
zone, permission for scientists from the
coastal state to participate in the research project, and open publication of
the research results. But we balk at the
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suggestion of a consequent requirement
to seek permission for research beyond
territorial limits; first, because of the
possibility that a coastal state will withhold consent for capricious reasons; and
second, because of the interminable
delays which have often been experienced in acquiring permission (or
being denied it) for U.S. vessels to carry
out research involving foreign states'
continental shelves. My own guess is
that the principle of freedom of scientific research in foreign states' economic
zones may turn out to be one of the
casualties of the Third Law of the Sea
Conference.
Next is environmental protection.
How will vessel-source pollution control
standards be established and enforced in
a coastal state's economic zone? One
point of view is that these matters are
coastal state prerogatives and, indeed,
that it might be possible for less developed countries to set up a system of
double standards-one for the vessels of
developed countries which use the
coastal state's ports and/or pass through
its national waters, and a more liberal
set of requirements for ships of the
coastal state itself and perhaps those of
its neighbors. Countering this is the
viewpoint that internationally agreed
upon standards should be put into force
(the standards to be set by the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization or some like body) and
that enforcement of the standards
should be primarily the responsibility of
the flag state. If a U.S. vessel, for
example, were found to be in violation
of the international standards off the
coast, say, of a West African state, the
offense would be a matter for the
United States to handle. Only in cases
where a direct disaster threatens the
coastal nation or if the flag state has
proven itself to be consistently unable
or unwilling to police its own ships
would the coastal state be entitled to
step in and, on its own, enforce the
environmental standards.

Between these two extremes are all
manner of positions. Can the coastal
state, for example, adopt in its economic zone, pollution-control standards
which are more severe than those set by
an international body? Are government
vessels, including warships, immune
from a state's pollution-control regulations? How will liability provisions be
enforced? Should there be an international liability to take care of incidents
such as the Torrey Canyon disaster?
Environmental protection is one area in
which many delegates often found
themselves way over their heads so far
as arguments over jurisdictional problems were concerned.
The same might be said for the next
issue-the International Seabed Resources Authority. Nearly everyone
agrees that the resources of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the common heritage of mankind and that a portion of the revenues
derived from their exploitation should
go to an international fund to be distributed to the nations of the world,
particularly the developing states. But at
this point, agreement ends. Let me
suggest just a few of the contentious
issues:
• Will the Authority exploit the
seabed minerals itself or license individual companies and states to carry out
the exploitations? (The United States
favors the licensing arrangements.)
• Will the Authority be permitted to
regulate rates of exploitation and/or to
fIx prices in order to stabilize the
minerals market and prevent undue
hardships to the economy of land producers of copper, nickel, cobalt, and
manganese? (The United States is
against production and price controls.)
• How will the Authority be governed? What states will be represented
on the governing bodies?
• How will decisions be made as to
allocation of the international funds?
Will a portion of these funds be set aside
to run the Authority itself?
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• How will the danger of pollution
from seabed exploration and exploitation be handled?
Some experts contend that no appreciable revenues will be forthcoming
from seabed mineral exploitation during
the decade of the 1970's. It is the
developed countries which initially
carry out that exploitation. If the rules
and regulations on seabed development
are perceived by them as being too
onerous, will the developed states ignore
international procedures and go ahead
unilaterally with their exploitation? For
some observers of the Third Law of the
Sea Conference, this appears to be a
very real possibility.
A related and, in my table of organization, a separate issue is that of
revenue sharing from mineral exploitation on the outer continental margin.
This is pretty much an exclusive U.S.
initiative. Several years ago the United
States suggested the creation of a "Trusteeship Zone" on the continental
margin beyond the 200-meter isobath.
In this Trusteeship Zone, which extended seaward to the international
area, the seabed would be under international control, but only the coastal state
or its lessee could explore and exploit
the resources. Although the Trusteeship
Zone concept seemed to have something
in it for everyone, it received little
support.
Now the United States suggests that
the coastal state have jurisdiction over
the outer continental margin's resources
but that a portion of the revenues
derived from resource exploitation beyond the 200-meter isobath or the
12-mile territorial limit (whichever is
farthest from shore) be turned over to
the in ternational fund. There are two
advantages to this proposal. First, it
provides that some funds will become
available to the International Authority
in the near future (as soon as the oil
companies, which are now exploiting
offshore in a maximum of about 400
feet of water, move to depths beyond

656 feet); second, it ensures that some
portion of the revenues from hydrocarbon exploitation on the outer continental margin will get to the international fund. Surprisingly, this U.S.
initiative has also met with little support-either from developed or developing states.
Arrangements for Dispute Settlement, the lOth of my 12 issues, is very
much up in the air. The United States
strongly supports compUlsory settlement of disputes-an interesting development inasmuch as we have never, I
believe, taken an international dispute
in which we were involved for settlement by the International Court of
Justice.
Most of the U.S. draft proposals have
in them compulsory dispute settlement
provisions. But many countries are wary
of this approach. The decisionmakers in
the settlement process will tend to be
from the developed states. The costs of
going to such a tribunal will be difficult
for poor countries to sustain. The
number of disputes requiring tribunal
action may become overwhelming.
Rather than negotiate seriously, developed states may elect to try the
tribunal route to settlement. Here is an
issue the outcome of which I have a
hard time visualizing. It is my understanding that no one of the three
Committees at Caracas became involved
this past summer in the dispute settlement problem.
Since I have mentioned the three
Committees, let me elaborate. At the
Caracas Conference there was, first, a
plenary session for about 3 weeks during which the Rules of Procedure were
adopted and delegations were given a
chance to present their countries' views.
About 115 delegations availed themselves of this opportunity. By the time
this plenary session was ending, meetings were beginning of the three Committees. These three were modeled on
the Subcommittees of the Seabed
Committee which met six times,
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alternatively in New York and Geneva,
from 1970 through 1973.
Committee I was concerned with the
international seabed area and with the
Authority which was to be set up to
manage it. The Committee made no
tangible progress whatever at Caracas.
The United States adopted a hard-line
position on the Authority and held to
it. Committee III handled Pollution
Control, Scientific Research, and Technology Transfer. It also made little
progress, although the diverse views on
research were narrowed down to four
alternatives, ranging from the "absolute
freedom" of the Soviets to the "absolute control" of the Group of 77.
Committee II, which concerned itself
with fisheries, straits, economic zones,
and other jurisdictional problems, was
under the able leadership of Andres
Anguilar of Venezuela. While it probably had the most complex problems of
any of the three Committees, it also
made the most progress. Ambassador
Aguilar was able to reduce national
positions on a whole host of issues to a
series of three or four alternatives for
each topic and to pave the way for
serious negotiations on these issues next
summer.
The last two issues of my outline
come under the heading "Regional
Arrangements." These involve a bit of
crystal-ball gazing. Multistate regional
arrangements to date have been very
limited in scope. There are, for example,
certain international fisheries organizations, but decisive action within the
framework of many of these is subject
to the unanimous consent of the parties
concerned. There are bilateral and
multilateral agreements (as, for example, the Baltic Sea Pollution Control
Agreement recently concluded), but
even these tend to be limited in extent
and to involve long-established developed countries. Yet, should there fail
to be a global Convention on the new
Law of the Sea in 1975 (or perhaps
1976), recourse may be necessary to

regional agreements-at whatever level
agreements can be arranged.
One type of such arrangement would
be exclusionary in nature; exclude nonlittoral fishing vessels from the Andaman or East China Seas; keep out
noncoastal military ships from the
Baltic or the Sea of Okhotsk. Such
arrangements cost little to the states of
the region. But how about situations in
which the littoral states invest something in the future of their common
offshore waters? They might enact
common pollution control regulations.
They might have a common approach to
fisheries conservation and management.
They might contribute to a regional
fund for improving navigational facilities or eliminating shipping hazards.
Such moves would be particularly
appropriate for enclosed or semienclosed seas. These conditions correspond to what I referred to earlier as
"mutual benefit" systems. Within semienclosed seas, littoral states might agree
on some mechanism for settling mutual
boundary delimitation issues in offshore
waters and for handling other types of
disputes involving the marine environment.
In contrast with this are what I
would term "compensatory arrangements." And here I confess to being
way out of my depth. It is one thing for
Tanzania to grant port facilities at Dar
es Salaam for copper shipments from
Zambia; it is another to give equal rights
to the companies of Malawi, Burundi,
Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia to share
in the development of Tanzania's economic zone resources. Pakistan has
closed the use of the port of Karachi to
Afghanistan because of border difficulties. Lesotho is entirely dependent on
the apartheid-oriented regime of South
Africa for its access to the sea. Bolivia
must depend on the vagaries of Chilean
politics for permission to use the port of
Arica. Who, I ask myself, is really going
to agree, as a matter of universal policy,
to the principle of compensatory
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arrangements for landlocked and other
geographically disadvantaged states?
Here is a concept which may require
decades to work out satisfactorily. It is
difficult enough to win approval of the
principle of access to the sea for landlocked countries. Much more difficult
will be the task of gaining support for
the concept of access by a disadvantaged state to the resources of another
country's economic zone.
Having covered, albeit briefly, the
principal topics at Caracas, let me now
make a few general observations on the
Conference as a whole.
First, what are the prospects for
some sort of Convention emerging from
the Third Law of the Sea Conference?
As I noted earlier, one of the roadblocks to any conclusive action in
Caracas was the absence of deadlines.
There were almost no serious concessions made, despite the talk of a "package" solution. But if the timetables hold
(and we do not go on to a 1976 meeting
in Africa or Asia-or as The New York
Times facetiously noted, of meetings in
Pnom Penh, Ulam Bator, and imally, of
all places, Philadelphia!), then Geneva
next spring is where agreement-if it is
to be reached at all-must be concluded.
And despite all the complexities and
uncertainties, it is possible that what
some observers say is true-namely, that
the delegations from the major powers
(including the United States) have instructions from their governments to
bring home an agreement from the
Third Law of the Sea Conference, and
they will therefore work hard to meet
this requirement.
It may be only a partial agreement
on some items. And it may take years
for even these agreements to be ratified
and to come into effect. Thus we are
faced with a protracted period in which
interim arrangements may be necessary.
Due to time limitations, I shall not
dwell on such arrangements, other than
to note that they will have both international and domestic implications-

witness the impatience of some groups
in the United States to proceed with the
200-mile fisheries zone and deep sea
mining bills rather than to wait for
international action on these issues.
My third and last point is, What
might the United States expect to
achieve in the way of its own special
interests from the Conference?
Here, I feel, we have to consider
certain alternatives, one of them being
that the United States might not sign
and ratify certain provisions of any
agreed Convention. I think we may lose
on the freedom of scientific research
issue, on international control of highly
migratory species, and perhaps on the
issue of full utilization of fisheries in the
economic zone. If we continue to maintain a hard line regarding the Seabed
Resources Authority, we may find ourselves isolated there as well, and I have
heard it said we might find it impossible
to sign and ratify the type of imal
agreement on this issue which proves
acceptable to a majority of the world's
states.
On three items, I just do not know. I
think it will be extremely difficult for
us to get general acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement, and I have
no knowledge as to what our fall-back
position on this might be. We may also
be hard pressed on the pollution control
issue. Certainly we may have to compromise somewhat on the rules setting and
rules enforcing procedures, but there is
also, it seems to me, the possibility (as
might also be the case with compUlsory
dispute settlement) that these items
could be kept aside for some future
deliberations rather than being embodied in a 1975 convention.
Finally-of particular interest to you
here-is the question of passage through
straits. My own feeling for this is contained in two observations. First, there
are only a limited number of countries
directly involved in this controversy. If
it can be kept from becoming an absolute article of faith on the part of the
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less developed countries (and of Spain)
and considered in terms of its own
merits and of the countries it affects,
then some solution may be possible.
Second, there are, I believe, only a
limited number of straits involved in
the problem-particularly in terms of
military ships and aircraft. Again, the
number of players can be narrowed
considerably and trade-offs may be
possible, involving not I ~O-plus
countries, but perhaps half a dozen or
so.
If one examines the Law of the Sea
negotiations in detail, one finds two
categories of participants. One are the
interest groups, geographic blocs, and
other expressions of multistate solidarity. Second are the ocean interests of
the individual states themselves-their
access to the sea and its resources, their
investments in marine-related activities,
their dependence on the sea for food,
income, security, or employment opportunities, and their general relations with
their neighbors or other relevant countries. Remember, any state's ocean
policies are but a part of their total
national policies. If a state has generally
poor relations with one or more of its
neighbors, it can hardly be expected to

cooperate closely when it comes to
ocean issues.
Since the close of the Caracas session, the press has been not altogether
favorable. Of what use, it is asked, were
the preliminary Seabeds Committee
meetings in New York and Geneva if
nothing tangible came out of 10 weeks
of high living in South America? What
can we expect from the money that will
be spent at Geneva next spring? Some
of the critics, I think, are unduly harsh.
Nearly 50 new delegations were at
Caracas which had not been represented
previously on the Seabeds Committee.
There was an enormous educational
process necessary in Venezuela, and
despite the absence of tangible agreements, many of the delegationsaccording to some observers-are a lot
closer to negotiating positions as a result
of last summer's experience than they
were several months ago. But my optimism declines when I speculate on the
fact that only 6 weeks or so are allotted
next spring for concluding a new Law of
the Sea Treaty. And I am thankful that
the title assigned to me for this talk was
"Issues in Negotiations" rather than
"The Consequences of No Agreement at
AlL"
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